





BEYOND SUPREME COURT ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION:  
AN ESSAY ON RACIAL SUBORDINATIONS, RACIAL 





In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed its 
examination of racial subordinations to focus upon three 
doctrinal approaches: disparate treatment racial 
discrimination, the intent theory of racial discrimination, and 
suspect category strict scrutiny.  Taken together, these three 
doctrines mutually reinforce racial discrimination as the only 
available legal understanding of racial subordination.  Faced 
with the Court’s ever contracting list of issues available for 
discussion, some scholars have chosen to investigate outside the 
Court’s constricted understanding of race.  This Essay begins 
by noting that racial subordinations—social subordinations 
premised on a schema of body types—are multiple and not 
limited to a single, narrow understanding.  After introducing 
the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach in Section I, I 
examine in Section II recent scholarship on racial 
subordination that has pressed beyond the doctrinal confines 
created by the Supreme Court. I review authors discussing 
Title VII, common law contract, racial tropes, implicit bias, 
patent law, and trademark. Section III examines Professor 
Anthony Farley’s concept of racial pleasure—the idea that 
racial subordination gives pleasure to its participants.  Racial 
pleasure is a form of racial subordination that falls outside of 
the Supreme Court’s understanding of racial subordination as 
racial discrimination.  Through the examination of race in 
computer games, I suggest two distinctions.  I observe a legal 
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distinction between racial pleasures and commodified racial 
pleasures, and a normative legal distinction between permitted 
racial pleasures and illicit racial pleasures.  Section III ends 
with a proposed standard for constitutional review of state 
regulation of illicit racial pleasures.  As another interpretation 
of racial subordination, Section IV proposes a theorization of 
commodified race through Marx’ theory of commodity 
circulation. 
 
[R]ace is not an objective biological fact but rather social and 
political constructions which establish and perpetuate 
hierarchies of power. 
-Historian Lucy Salyer, reviewing Ariela Gross’  




A. Racial Subordination 
 
Lucy Salyer’s comment extends the observation that “race is 
socially constructed.”2  Salyer notes that race is not a single, 
scientific fact.  Instead, there exist multiple forms of socially and 
politically constructed race.  Further, she challenges the traditional 
legal notion that racism is fundamentally racial discrimination of 
individuals.  Instead of individual discrimination or discriminatory 
intent, she situates racial constructions within social hierarchies of 
power.  This Essay builds upon this idea and examines and theorizes 
multiple forms of racial subordination.  Within legal studies, there is 
tension between the Supreme Court’s ever narrowing range of racial 
issues acceptable for Court review and efforts by legal scholars to 
examine racial subordinations that go beyond a narrow treatment of 
racial discrimination. 
 
                                                                                                       
1  Lucy Salyer, What Blood Won’t Tell, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 179 (2010) 
(reviewing ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL:  A HISTORY OF RACE 
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Race (1996).  Haney-Lopez examined the “racial prerequisite cases” that 
interpreted the 1790 federal statute limiting naturalization to become a U.S. 
citizen to “white persons.”  Haney-Lopez traces the evolution of “white” 
under the statute. 
  





B. The Supreme Court’s Narrow Anti-Discrimination 
Treatment of Race 
 
In recent years, the Supreme Court’s treatment of race has 
devolved into three dimensions:  disparate treatment discrimination, 
the intent theory of discrimination, and suspect category strict 
scrutiny.  While initially developed in related but different areas of 
constitutional and statutory civil rights law, they have grown 
together so that each influences and supports the other.  Implicit in 
all three is the use of neutral, formal racial categories. 
Under Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis 
of race in employment, the Court formulated a clear version of 
disparate treatment discrimination in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green.3  
Differential treatment of employees of different races when the 
employees are similarly situated shifts the burden to the employer to 
provide a non-racial explanation.  Failure to provide an adequate 
justification for the differential treatment leads to a legal conclusion 
of racial discrimination.  This basic approach was expanded in Griggs 
v. Duke Power to encompass statistically-based demonstrations of 
differential treatment of groups of employees.4  This structure has 
been maintained in the Court’s subsequent treatments of 
employment discrimination. 
The intent theory of discrimination was explicitly articulated 
in Washington v. Davis.5  Under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court rejected Title VII’s statistically-
based employment discrimination methodology it had accepted in 
Griggs v. Duke Power.  Under the Washington v. Davis approach, only a 
conclusion of subjective intent to discriminate could be the basis for 
a violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection.   
The third of these racial treatments, strict scrutiny review of 
government use of race, was consolidated in the Court’s line of 
affirmative action cases beginning with its decision in Richmond v. 
Croson.6  The line of cases following Richmond have been the Court’s 
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prima facie showing by plaintiff, the burden shifts to the employer. 
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principal examinations of race.7  All apply the rigid strict scrutiny 
analysis with almost no social interests recognized as meeting the 
“compelling governmental interest” standard. 
In the Court’s treatment, these three understandings of 
racial discrimination have become not simply available theories of 
discrimination, but the Court’s entire discussion of race.  Instead of 
being a list of three possible legal treatments of the social issue of 
race, the Court’s continuing focus upon these three treatments has 
limited implicitly the boundaries of the discussion of race in the law.  
In each of these, the court relies upon the racial label of an 
individual party claiming racial discrimination to be a formal-race 
category.8  That is, the racial label assigning race is a neutral label.  
There are no social presumptions attached to the racial label of any 
party.  The social meaning attached to someone being “white” or 
“black” or “Asian” are matters to be proven by plaintiffs for each 
individual charged with discrimination either as a proof that the 
individuals are “similarly situated” for purposes of disparate 
treatment discrimination, or proof that there is subjective intent in 
the mind of the person charged with discrimination.  All 
government efforts to address questions of race directly now face 
almost certain rejection under strict scrutiny.  The Court simply does 
not recognize any social concerns as meeting the “compelling 
governmental interest” requirement under strict scrutiny.  
Also common to all three treatments of racial discrimination 
is locating the normative wrong of racial subordination in the mind 
of a single perpetrator—or, for strict scrutiny—a government actor.  
For disparate treatment, if the parties are deemed equal or similarly 
situated, then the wrong of racial discrimination is within the party 
charged with discrimination.  The intent theory goes further and 
says that only evil racial animus, located in the party charged with 
discrimination, violates equal protection of the laws with respect to 
race.  These elements—disparate treatment of neutral, formal race 
categories and racial animus located in the party charged with racial 
discrimination—have structured the Court’s narrow understanding:  
race discrimination and only race discrimination embodies racial 
subordination. 
                                                                                                       
7  See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  
8  See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Colorblind, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of colorblind 
constitutionalism fosters white supremacy). 
  





Since the Court controls the cases that it chooses to review, 
its non-acceptance of questions of racial subordination beyond this 
very narrow doctrinal range have resulted in legal scholarship 
similarly narrow in scope.  Legal writers must either make strenuous 
efforts to push the boundaries of “disparate treatment” 
discrimination, racial “intent” or “compelling government interest” 
or simply abandon any pretense to working within the Supreme 
Court’s doctrinal guidelines.  This narrowing by the Court has been 
a continuing source of frustration for those seeking racial justice in 
the legal arena.   
In this Essay, I argue that there have been significant efforts 
in disparate areas of the legal scholarship to address race beyond 
disparate treatment, the intent theory, and suspect category strict 
scrutiny.  Scholars have pushed the boundaries of existing doctrine 
through racial analysis in doctrinal areas not traditionally thought to 
encompass race, or they have developed new understandings of 
racial subordination and the law.  Besides observing racial 
subordination in structural or institutional frameworks, these 
authors note the importance of social and cultural dimensions to 
racial subordination.   
Section I reviews authors working in diverse doctrinal areas:  
Title VII, common law contract, racial profiling and intellectual 
property.  Section II develops Anthony Farley’s work on racial 
pleasure—the idea that racial subordination gives pleasure to the 
participants.  Section III develops the idea that certain forms of 
racial subordination are commodified and may be theorized as 
commodified race within Marx’ theory of capitalist commodity 
circulation. 
 
I. BEYOND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION—NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON RACIAL SUBORDINATIONS 
 
A. Pushing Doctrinal Limitations 
 
In this section, we review seven articles that examine racial 
subordinations outside of the narrow confines established by the 
Supreme Court.  We begin with two articles that explicitly seek to 
expand the doctrinal limits of antidiscrimination doctrine.  The first 
article addresses Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barring 
discrimination in employment.  The second examines the common 
law doctrine of good faith in contract law.  
 
 




1. Racial Performance in the Workplace—Performing Employment 
Discrimination. 
 
In their 2000 article, “Working Identity,” Devon Carbado 
and Mitu Gulati begin by stating that “working within an 
organization necessarily entails negotiating and performing 
identity.”9  Besides an individual’s own sense of identity, Carbado 
and Gulati argue that for minority employees, there may well be 
negative stereotypes attributed to them.  To succeed, therefore, a 
minority employee must perform extra identity work to counter 
those stereotypes.  They give the examples of “signaling” hard work 
by mentioning in a casual conversation how tired one is because of 
having to work late the previous nights.  Or after working late, 
sending an email to a supervisor before leaving signals late working 
hours.  While this kind of signaling and identity performance is 
commonplace, for a minority employee faced with a racial 
stereotype of being lazy or passive at work, the performance and 
signaling become an additional workplace obligation.  They argue 
that employment discrimination law should recognize “racial 
conduct discrimination” as legally actionable.10  
Carbado and Gulati explore at length the example of a 
black, male law professor teaching criminal procedure.  They note a 
range of possible stereotypes that the professor may encounter:  a 
color conscious “race man,” ideological, weak work ethic, 
unqualified, anti-institutional, racial group oriented, and subjective.  
Within his criminal procedure class, he must take into account the 
presence of these stereotypes and how he must “work” to counter 
their effect on his teaching, in addition to considerations of teaching 
the material.  If a case involves a black defendant, he must factor 
into his teaching his own racial identity.  He must make choices 
about how to negotiate his identity in relation to the case, his 
students, and perceptions of his colleagues.  Carbado and Gulati 
argue that this “racial conduct” is additional work that should be 
taken into account.11  They observe that: 
Current antidiscrimination regimes focus almost entirely 
on the employer.  Lost in this focus are the costs borne 
by victims who do identity work to prevent employment 
discrimination and preempt stereotyping.  Further, to 
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the extent that antidiscrimination law ignores identity 
work, it will not be able to address “racial conduct” 
discrimination.  Racial conduct discrimination derives, 
not simply from the fact that an employee is, for 
example, phenotypically Asian American (i.e., her racial 
status) but also from how she performs her Asian 
American identity in the workplace (i.e., her racial 
conduct).”12   
Carbado and Gulati describe identity performance in the 
workplace as including negotiations—a relationship of power and 
authority.  The metaphor of performance and negotiation describes 
actors, audience, and scripts (acting scenarios) within a set of power 
relationships.13  Together, they comprise a setting for racial 
subordination where the crucial activities are not the disparate 
treatment of a particular category of employee by an employer, but a 
complex hierarchy of power and authority in which important 
activities are based upon social expectations and social stereotypes.  
Carbado and Gulati’s expansion of employment discrimination 
doctrine goes beyond employer conduct and interrogates the social 
and cultural racial meanings attached to all participants in the 
workplace.  To address this mode of performative racial 
subordination, they seek an extension of Title VII beyond the 
boundaries currently imposed by the Supreme Court.   
 
2. Good Faith Doctrine in Contract Law 
 
In Emily Houh’s article, “Critical Race Realism:  Re-
Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of 
Good Faith in Contract Law,”14 Houh completes a trilogy of articles 
that critique the doctrine of good faith in contract law.  In “Critical 
Race Realism,” she argues that: 
[A]s a normative matter and due to the inadequacies of 
civil rights remedies, good faith should be used to 
prohibit discriminatory conduct based on race, gender, 
sexual identity, age and/or other categories of identity in 
the contractual context”15  
                                                                                                       
12  Id. at 1262-63. 
13  Id. 1267-1278 
14  Emily Houh, Critical Race Realism:  Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination 
Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 
455 (2005). 
15  Id. at 455. 
 





[A] common law antidiscrimination claim that, first, 
incorporates contemporary re-conceptualizations of 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, and second, grounds 
itself doctrinally not in civil rights law but in the 
contractually implied obligation of good faith . . . . 
Moreover, it seeks, through its proposal of the common 
law claim, to explicitly re-conceive the private law 
doctrine of good faith as one that might assist in 
effecting a public law norm of equality.”16 
Houh uses employees in the workplace as an example of her thesis.  
She states, “The good faith discrimination claim proposed in this 
Article focuses on what constitutes ‘reasonable expectations’ with 
respect to racial or gender subordination in the workplace.”17  
Drawing upon Carbado and Muti’s work on performance in the 
workplace, Houh argues that “employees may reasonably expect not 
to have to perform to a set of scripted identities in the workplace . . . 
. [A]ny ‘scripted’ expectation that an employer has of a particular 
employee related to his race would be deemed unreasonable.”18  She 
then explores several actual reported decisions under federal civil 
rights laws where claims were denied.  She argues that a common 
law claim for breach of good faith could have been available to 
address their treatment.19 
As with the proposals of Carbado and Muti, Houh’s project 
seeks to address the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s narrow 
understanding of racial discrimination.  Houh’s project points 
toward the possibilities of imaginative re-conceptualizations of 
common law doctrines and anti-discrimination theory. 
 
B. Racial Tropes and Stereotypes 
 
1. Racial Politics of Asian American Foreignness 
 
In my 2001 article, “Citizenship Nullification: The 
Impossibility of Asian American Politics,” I argue that racialization 
of Chinese Americans in the nineteenth century included the key 
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element of foreignness.20  Foreignness here refers to the general 
racial stereotype or racial trope of being a “permanent foreigner”—
that a person who looks like her ancestry can be traced to Asia is 
presumed to be an immigrant.  That racial trope can be used to 
undermine that person’s “Americanness.”   
Foreignness as an Asian American racial trope has been 
widely discussed.21  I use the examples from electoral politics to 
show how the use of racial tropes can be a hindrance and even a 
barrier to full political participation.  The article discusses the 
campaign finance scandals from the 1996 presidential elections 
involving Chinese Americans.  After revelations that some campaign 
donations had been from Chinese non-citizens and exceeded 
campaign limits, there was a flurry of newspaper and media accounts 
suggesting the donations were bribes by Asians who did not 
understand the democratic process or were efforts by China to 
influence the election.22  The Democratic Party then compiled a list 
of donors with Asian surnames and called them, asking for proof of 
their citizenship.23  The reaction among Asian Americans was 
immediate and vocal and the Democratic Party apologized.24   
A more recent example of permanent foreignness was the 
2010 campaign of Nikki Haley for governor of South Carolina.  
Haley, born Nimrata Nikki Randhawa of Sikh immigrant parents, 
converted to Christianity as an adult.  She made frequent public 
statements about her faith and included a place within her campaign 
website that directly addressed her religion.  Nevertheless, her 
campaign faced constant charges that she was untruthful about her 
religion, including rumors that she was a Buddhist.25 
In these examples, Asian Americans who wished to 
participate in the electoral process through campaign donations or 
political candidacy faced significant difficulties when confronted by 
                                                                                                       
20  Neil Gotanda, Citizenship Nullification: The Impossibility of Asian 
American Politics, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND POLITICS: PERSPECTIVES, 
EXPERIENCES, PROSPECTS 79 (Gordon Chang ed., 2001) [hereinafter Gotanda, 
Citizenship Nullification]. 
21  See Neil Gotanda, New Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 17 
ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 (2010), for a discussion of this concept and the articles cited 
therein illustrating the same [hereinafter Gotanda, New Directions]. 
22  Gotanda, Citizenship Nullification, supra note 20, at 94. 
23  Id. at 94-95. 
24  Id. at 95. 
25  Peter Wallsten & Valerie Bauerlein, Haley Keeps Taking the Southern 
Test, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704256304575321350649162856.html. 
 




the permanent foreignness trope.  The nature of this stereotype is 
racial—the foreignness trope is linked to the Asian body.  The trope 
of foreignness can be deployed by any person against any Asian 
American political candidate.  Further, racial tropes are embedded 
and available within popular and mainstream culture.  Widespread 
stereotypes and tropes become a part of “common sense” and 
popular understanding.  Because of its pervasive availability, the 
foreignness trope is not a form of malicious racial animus.  The 
trope is not the kind of race hatred or racial disparagement, located 
within the person invoking the racial trope, that is the basis for a 
finding of racial animus.  Nor is there any disparate treatment, since 
an inquiry into the legal requirements for campaign donations or a 
person’s religious background is not based upon racial categories.  
These practices fall outside of the Supreme Court’s narrow 
understanding of racial discrimination.  
 
2. Driving While Black and Flying While Brown Racial Profiling 
 
The scenario of an African American driver being stopped 
on a pretext by a police officer is now well-known—“driving while 
Black.”26  The straightforward discrimination critique is that the 
police stop involved disparate treatment—a similarly situated white 
driver would not have been stopped.  Besides this discriminatory 
dimension, there are racial stereotypes and tropes in play.  “Driving 
while black” is often described as “racial profiling.”  The racial 
profile is itself a constructed understanding, built from significant 
social and cultural elements—racial stereotypes and racial tropes.  
Thus, in addition to disparate treatment, an essential element of 
racial profiling is the inclusion of stereotypes and tropes.  The police 
traffic stop is an assertion of police power and racial authority based 
upon the “common-sense” validity of the racial profile.  If it could 
be shown that the stop for “driving while Black” was based on racial 
animus or primarily because of the race of the driver, then there is a 
claim for racial discrimination.  Proving such a claim is extremely 
difficult.  Police have great latitude and discretion in initiating a 
simple traffic stop.  Proof of racial animus is difficult, since beyond 
the office and the driver, there are usually few witnesses.  The 
availability of stereotypes and tropes of criminality associated with 
black bodies, supports the reasonableness of any such traffic stop.  
                                                                                                       
26  The literature on ‘driving while black” and racial profiling is 
extensive.  See, e.g., the work of David A. Harris, including David A. Harris, The 
Stories, The Statistics and the Law:  Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 265 (1999). 
  





The practice therefore eludes legal remedy under narrow theories of 
racial discrimination. 
The role of the racial profile is clarified in the use of “flying 
while brown”—racial profiling against those who “look like a 
terrorist” at airports.27  Different bodies, racial categories, and racial 
stereotypes are involved when the racial profiling is an airport stop 
of someone who “looks like a Muslim terrorist.”28  The key element 
is the racial stereotype of the “Muslim terrorist” applied to a Brown 
body.  These stops and interrogations take place in very public 
settings—airports and aboard airplanes—so there are often many 
witnesses.  The airport stop, since it so often involves someone who 
looks “Middle-Eastern” or South-Asian, could be susceptible to a 
claim of disparate racial treatment.  The difficulty in showing 
discrimination, however, grows out of the response that the stop 
was reasonable.  That is, the application of the racial terrorist 
trope—someone who looks brown can be a terrorist—is regarded as 
reasonable and not malicious racial animus.  Thus, any claim of 
disparate treatment is dismissed as justified, and any claim of racial 
animus is unavailable given the reasonableness of the racial 
stereotype.  The availability and pervasive nature of the racial trope 
gives airport racial profiling its legitimacy.   
 
C. Regulated Culture—Racial Subordinations in 
Intellectual Property 
 
1. Implicit Bias and the FCC Public Interest Doctrine 
 
In “Trojan Horses of Race,” Jerry Kang surveyed the 
emerging body of work on “implicit bias.”29  Kang describes this 
research in the field of social cognition as elaborating on “ ‘racial 
mechanics’—the ways in which race alters intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, and intergroup interactions.”30  Kang argues that 
“[t]his research demonstrates that most of us have implicit biases in 
the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) 
against racial minorities.”31 
                                                                                                       
27  See generally Neil Gotanda, The Racialization of Islam in American 
Law, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., September 2011, at 184-195, and 
the articles cited therein. 
28  Gotanda, New Directions, supra note 21. 
29  Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).  
30  Id. at 1493. 
31  Id. at 1493-94. 
 




Kang then goes on to show how the work on “implicit bias” 
and his description of “racial mechanics” offers more than engaging 
theoretical analysis.  He examines federal communications policy, 
specifically the application of the “public interest” standard in the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) policies on media 
ownership.32  Kang argues that the ownership rules that were 
justified as encouraging local news would not necessarily advance 
“diversity” and “localism.”33  Instead, the disproportionate emphasis 
in local news on portrayals of racial minorities as violent criminals 
would exacerbate the implicit biases against racial minorities.34  
Kang argues that these images, transmitted with great 
effectiveness in local news broadcasts, are “Trojan Horse viruses” 
that infiltrate our world view and affect our understandings and 
actions in relation to racial minorities.35  Kang proposes that the 
FCC “re-code the ‘Public Interest’ standard” in its media ownership 
policy.36  In particular, he argues that the FCC should not limit its 
diversity analysis to news and public affairs programming, but 
should expand its considerations to entertainment programming.37  
Acknowledging the difficulty of such a project, Kang argues that 
programs could be reviewed for explicit and implicit bias under an 
expanded FCC approach to the “public interest.”38 
Kang’s work on implicit bias demonstrates the presence of 
racial subordination that is inaccessible to the Supreme Court’s 
narrow understanding of racial discrimination.  By definition, 
implicit bias does not meet the requirements for intentional racial 
animus, since such discriminatory intent must be conscious and 
proven.  Further, Kang’s example of the use of the FCC’s Public 
Interest standard as supporting racial bias simply does not fit within 
the Court’s understanding of similarly situated individuals treated in 
disparate fashion.   
 
                                                                                                       
32  Id. at 1545. 
33  Id. at 1546-47. 
34  Id. at 1551-52. 
35  Kang, supra note 29, at 1553-54. 
36  Id. at 1572. 
37  Id. at 1568. 
38  Id. at 1569-70. 
  





2. Encouraging Innovation While Avoiding Harm to Racial   
Minorities in Patent Law  
 
In “Race Specific Patents, Commercialization, and 
Intellectual Property Policy,” Shubha Ghosh examines the 
phenomenon of “ ‘race specific patents’—patents that cover 
inventions tailored to certain racially or ethically defined groups.”39  
Ghosh notes that while scholars have examined racial issues in 
trademark and copyright, race in patent law has been largely 
overlooked.40  Motivated by the grant of a 2002 patent for a 
hypertension drug designed for use by “black patients,”41 Ghosh 
reviewed over a thousand patents that claimed or used racial 
categories.  Ghosh observes: 
At one level, the identification of racial categories in 
patents arguably reflects deep social hierarchies . . . . But 
racial categories in patent law are not simply mirrors of 
social realities.  Arguably, the use of racial categories in 
patent law may serve to create differences.  If patents do 
crudely incentivize inventive activities or more subtly 
structure the market within which inventive activity 
occurs, then the use of racial categories in patent law 
arguably creates racialized boundaries, perhaps not as 
invidious as “WHITES ONLY” signs on bathroom 
doors or drinking fountains, but at least as 
problematic.42  
Ghosh’ review of these patents notes that the use of racial 
categories could stigmatize as well as promote racial inclusion.  
Ghosh makes three policy recommendations:  (1) race-specific 
claims should not be enforced, (2) race should not be a 
consideration in the nonobviousness analysis, and (3) race can be a 
limited factor in the beneficial utility analysis.43  In formulating a 
normative framework for his proposals for patent law, Ghosh seeks 
to maintain the broad intellectual property goal of encouraging 
innovation while avoiding harm to racial minorities and encouraging 
pluralism and affirmative empowerment within civil society.44   
                                                                                                       
39  Shubha Ghosh, Race Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual 
Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 410 (2008). 
40  Id. at 416. 
41  Id. at 411. 
42  Id. at 414. 
43  Id. at 410. 
44  Id. at 466-67. 
 




3. Blackness and Identity in Trademark and Copyright 
 
Another study of intellectual property and race, although 
very different in theme is David Dante Troutt’s 2005 article, 
“Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man:  Intellectual Property, 
Commodification and Redescription.”45  In the article, MarCus, a 
fictitious black man, seeks to be the proprietor of himself as 
property by becoming the first federally-registered human 
trademark.  Examples of celebrities whose marketing suggest 
trademark status are Martha Stewart, Tiger Woods, Michael Jordan, 
or Michael Jackson.46  Through the trademark mechanism, MarCus 
seeks “to redescribe the social meanings associated with his black 
male identity in market terms, terms over which he would have strict 
and valuable control.”47  Troutt’s article is a broad-ranging 
examination of the complexities posed by the commodification of 
race.   
In the first section, Troutt uses the device of a first-person 
narrative.  MarCus is an enormously successful black advertising 
executive who decides that a means to advance himself is to become 
his own trademark.  He is clear, however, that if he were to describe 
himself as a black man, his application would likely be denied.  His 
application for a trademark therefore describes his trademark-self as 
“colorblind.”  Here is the language from his trademark application: 
A trademark including the name, image, voice and 
public persona of “MarCus,” majority owner of 
MarCus, LLP, a person exclusive of race, gender, 
national origin or religious affiliation, engaged in the 
interstate sale of advertising and market promotion 
services in sponsorship with product manufacturers and 
service providers and described as visually assertive, 
uncompromising, independent amoral, cool and 
colorblind.48 
The crucial language is the self-description of “visually assertive, 
uncompromising, independent, amoral, cool” posed against 
“colorblind.”49 Trout is setting up the internal confrontation 
                                                                                                       
45  David Dante Troutt, Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man:  
Intellectual Property, Commodification and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 
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between MarCus’ blackness as giving him his market authority, yet 
claiming through his assertion of “colorblind” that these traits do 
not “really” involve blackness.  Troutt has MarCus explain his 
strategy: 
Unlike my parents’ generation of blacks, I would 
trademark instead of being stereotyped, turning chronic 
commercial disadvantage into its opposite.  Second, as a 
technical matter, perpetrating the fraud of nonraciality 
would assuage an examiner’s instinctive reaction against 
a racialized mark.  (A “black man” trademark would be 
rejected out of hand.)50 
Troutt elaborates on this strategy.   
[A]s a black man, [MarCus] believes that his chances of 
success would be substantially greater if he were to 
disclaim the racial aspect of his identity.  That is, he 
accepts that his culture, like most cultures, emphasizes 
race in its code of social meanings.  These social 
meanings are composed of . . . spoken and unspoken 
social ambivalence about race . . . . [Marcus] believes 
that his legal project requires social de-construction of 
such codes.  This task lies at the heart of his 
redescription through commercial symbolization. 
Therefore, his colorblind claim must somehow refigure 
consumer expectations.51 
Troutt carries forward his analysis of MarCus’ quest to become the 
first human trademark, concluding that as a strategy for freedom, 
this quest for ultimate commodification will fail because of the 
inability to maintain a private racial persona—his blackness—and a 
public, fraudulent colorblind identity.52   
These authors are illustrative of the efforts by scholars to 
explore the issues of racial subordination beyond the limits of the 
Supreme Court’s narrow understanding of anti-discrimination.  In 
the next section, I examine a mode of racial subordination that is 
not framed as discrimination. 
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II. RACIAL PLEASURE—RACIAL  SUBORDINATION WITHOUT 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
A. Racial Pleasure 
 
In this section, I examine the notion of racial pleasure as a 
form of racial subordination.  Unlike the earlier examinations that 
seek to extend the established boundaries of racial subordination as 
discriminatory treatment, racial pleasure is a different form of 
subordination.  Rather than the disparate treatment of neutral racial 
categories, the idea that racial pleasure is subordination is grounded 
in the difference in position between the subject and the object of 
pleasure derived from raced bodies.  Within racial pleasures, I 
suggest two divisions.  There is a legal normative distinction 
between permitted racial pleasures and illicit racial pleasures.  
Second, there is a legal distinction between racial pleasures and 
commodified racial pleasures.   
One can see permitted racial pleasures, or simply racial 
pleasures, in such well-discussed areas as sports, music, and dance.  
Illicit racial pleasures include activities now regarded as unlawful—
slavery and lynching—as well as such questionable practices as racial 
cross-burnings.  Illicit racial pleasures are subject to direct 
regulation—criminal prohibitions and anti-discrimination laws.  
Permitted racial pleasures may be subject to legal review under First 
Amendment standards.  Further, if racial pleasures are commodified, 
or property, then such commodified racial pleasures are subject to 
commercial regulation and intellectual property regulation. 
 
1. The Black Body as Fetish Object 
 
Anthony Farley explores the concept of racial pleasure in a 
legal context in his 1997 article, “The Black Body as Fetish 
Object.”53  While Farley’s presentation is complex, his core notion 
of racial pleasure is deceptively simple—racial subordination gives 
pleasure.  Farley states:  “In this Article, I describe ‘race’ as a form 
of sadomasochistic pleasure . . . . I argue that whiteness is a sadistic 
pleasure and that the black body is a fetish object and that law 
participates in producing these themes . . . .”54  Farley’s extension of 
sadomasochistic theory—that race relations involve constitutive 
dimensions of power and pleasure—is a compelling interpretation 
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with significant implications.  Unlike the previous examples of racial 
subordination, there is no comparable notion in race discrimination.  
Power and pleasure are not a part of the anti-discrimination 
framework for racial subordination.  
 
2. Race in Computer Games 
 
My examination of racial pleasure grew out of research into 
race in computer games.55  In computer gaming, a study of race 
immediately raises several problems.  First, there are no real bodies, 
only representations in virtual space.  Whether as avatars operated 
by players or as enemy representations to be defeated, there are no 
real bodies.  Second, the non-human representations are 
problematic.  Human representations are easy to recognize.  A large, 
menacing African American gangster clearly includes a racial 
component.  But the racial content of a wizard or an elf is less than 
obvious.  Third, computer gaming as a recreational activity is not a 
recognized area for the legal study of race.  While there is a rich 
literature on race in sport, especially professional sports, legal studies 
usually address race within the traditional discrimination 
framework.56   
My research into computer gaming as a recreational activity 
led to the literature on “autoletic activites” that involve “formal and 
extensive energy output on the part of the actor, yet provide few if 
any conventional rewards.”57  Computer games involve extensive 
activity without any monetary compensation or other traditional 
returns.  Its rewards come in the form of personal enjoyment in the 
gaming activity itself.  In the most popular forms of computer 
gaming, combat and conquest provide the greatest rewards to 
participants.  The conquest and defeat of virtual enemies provides 
moments of intense personal pleasure.  When the conquered and 
defeated object images have racial content, it is possible to posit a 
connection between the pleasures of virtual conquest and the 
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racialized images.58  Thus, when the images are racialized, the 
pleasures of gaming include racialized pleasures.  Virtual conquest of 
racialized images is a means of using and consuming those racial 
images.  The player thus derives racial pleasure in the consumption 
of the virtual racialized images.59   
In “The Black Body as Fetish Object,” Farley explains: 
[N]ot all bodily pleasures are sexual.  People can create 
pleasures out of very peculiar things, even out of 
suffering or inflicting pain.  Race is such a pleasure . . . . 
The colorline, like love, is a many-splendored thing, and 
its definition is elusive.  The colorline, in one aspect, is 
comprised of the rules of the sadomasochistic game also 
known to us as race relations . . . . In other aspects the 
colorline appears as a form of economic or political 
exploitation . . . . [Thus,] race is the preeminent pleasure 
of our time.  Whiteness is not a color; it is a way of 
feeling pleasure in and about one’s body . . . . [T]he 
black body is needed to fulfill this desire for race-
pleasure.  In our colorlined world, the white body is a 
form of desire and the black body is a form of 
pleasure.60 
The concept of racial pleasure—that racial practices lead to 
distinct enjoyment and pleasure as part of the practice of racial 
subordination—has an intuitive resonance.  When a white person 
exercises authority over a non-white person, that assertion of power 
is linked to the pleasure of dominance.  That pleasure also is linked 
to the humiliation suffered by the victim.   As Farley suggests, 
pleasure can be created in peculiar forms.  Carrying the idea of 
pleasure and pain into computer games, the pleasures of computer 
gaming—when the combat and conquest are of racialized 
characters—include racial pleasure.  The game experience, while not 
“real,” is powerful.  The pleasures of racial conquest in the game 
world are potent surrogates for racial pleasure in the “real world.”  
The autoletic activity of computer gaming—activity without any 
conventional rewards—creates its own forms of pleasure.  If the 
white body is a form of desire and the black body is a form of 
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pleasure, then the computer game player is a site of desire and the 
raced virtual representations are a form of racial pleasure.   
 
B. Permitted Racial Pleasures and Illicit Racial Pleasures 
 
If one accepts Farley’s description of racial pleasure, then a 
vast array of cultural activities, especially in American popular 
culture, are open to re-interpretation.  Participation in music, sports, 
and dance include racial pleasures.  Commercial activities such as 
cinema, theater, popular music, and professional sports are 
significant locales for the consumption of racial pleasures.  While 
the topic is broad, our interest here is relatively narrow—the 
regulation of these racial pleasures.   
Some racial pleasures are now definitively regarded as 
unlawful and  proscribed by both criminal and civil penalties.  Racial 
chattel slavery is the clearest example.  Lynching is also now 
regarded as abhorrent and subject to the most severe criminal 
penalties.  Both of these practices included significant dimensions of 
sadistic racial pleasures.  A practice whose status remains contested 
is racial cross-burning—the subject of a Clarence Thomas dissent.61   
At issue in Virginia v. Black were the convictions of three 
men charged with violating a Virginia statute that banned cross 
burnings intending to intimidate a person or group of persons.62  
The majority overturned the convictions while Thomas vigorously 
dissented.  Thomas begins his dissent with the admonition, “In 
every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what 
outsiders can comprehend.  That goes for both the sacred, and the 
profane.  I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of 
the latter.”63  
Thomas goes on to explain that there are some 
communications that are so laden with historical meaning that they 
clearly convey “intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist 
expression.”64  For Thomas, cross burning is such a moment, and 
the activity can be subject to direct government regulation.   
For the majority, the practices in question were protected 
under the First Amendment.  A First Amendment expression 
                                                                                                       
61  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388-400 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
62  Id. at 347-51. 
63  Id. at 388. 
64  Id. at 394. 
 




analysis is the preferred framework for review of regulatory efforts 
aimed at expressive pleasures.  The only area of expressive pleasure 
where the Court has consistently upheld regulation is its obscenity 
category.65  The majority and dissent outline the distinction between 
permitted racial pleasures and illicit racial pleasures.  Permitted racial 
pleasures are those racial pleasures that the Court regards as 
protected under freedom of expression.   Permitted racial pleasures 
are not subject to direct forms of legal regulation.  If a racial 
pleasure is sufficiently linked to a practice that is legally 
proscribed—slavery or lynching—then the pleasure is an illicit racial 
pleasure and is subject to direct legal regulation. 
To further explore practices that involve racial pleasure but 
are linked to proscribed forms of racial subordination, we can re-
examine two practices discussed earlier, racial profiling and racial 
performance in the workplace. 
 
1. Illicit Racial Pleasures—Profiling and Performance 
 
A moment of racial pleasure—racial humiliation—can be 
seen in the process of racial profiling described above.  A police 
stop for driving-while-black includes the key elements of the 
“sadomasochistic game” that Farley describes.  The officer, 
witnesses, and those who learn of the account through subsequent 
communications all can enjoy the pain that the officer inflicted.66 
That moment of racial pleasure is the moment at which the 
racial trope—black criminality—is invoked and imposed on a black 
body.  Thus, racial stereotyping corresponds to a moment of racial 
pleasure.  Racial pleasure during the driving-while-black traffic stop 
can be seen as the “consumption” of the racial trope.  To our earlier 
discrimination analysis, we can add an analysis of racial pleasure.  
Both forms of racialized treatment are present and both should be 
described.  Racial profiling or racial stereotyping—the invocation of 
a racial trope and its inscription on a raced body—is not a 
misunderstanding.  It is a moment of racial pleasure as well as racial 
discrimination.  
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A similar analysis applies to racial performance in the 
workplace.  The very term “racial performance” suggests a scenario 
for racial pleasures.  Any performance includes an audience, who in 
some form derives pleasure from the actors in the performance.  
When an employer expects a particular set of stereotyped 
expectations, racial pleasure can take place in different ways.  If the 
employer knows that the stereotype is at odds with the minority 
employees personal preferences (e.g., dress or grooming), then the 
employer can enjoy the humiliation of the minority employee or the 
paternal pleasure of making the employee perform her success in the 
workplace.  The racial performance may also be directed to please 
others in the workplace.  Co-workers and superiors consume the 
workplace racial performance for their own racial pleasure. 
These examples describe the presence of illicit racial 
pleasures in unlawful discriminatory practices.  There remain the 
multitude of non-discriminatory practices that include racial 
pleasures.  These permitted racial pleasures are not necessarily 
entirely free from regulation.  In many cases, the racial pleasure is in 
the form of a commodity or property.  As a commodity, racial 
pleasure is subject to contract and intellectual property regulation.  
As property, racial pleasure that has been propertized is subject to 
legal treatment as a form of property.67  To further examine 
commodified racial pleasure, we return to our examination of 
computer games. 
 
C. Racial Pleasures and Commodified Racial 
Pleasures 
 
Computer gaming is not a simple recreational activity.  
Computer gaming is technically complex and a very significant 
commercial activity.  The pleasures of computer gaming are 
packaged and sold.  They are commodified pleasures.  Therefore, 
the racial pleasures in computer games are commodified racial 
pleasures. 
If racial pleasures are seen as commodified, then a vast array 
of racially encoded commercial activities can be re-interpreted as 
commodified racial pleasures.  Various forms of commercial 
entertainment—music, cinema, sports—include components of 
racial pleasure alongside other forms of pleasure.  In its 
commodified form, racial pleasure is packaged, sold, and consumed.  
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As a commodity, we participate most fully in racial pleasure at the 
moment that the racialized commodity is consumed.  The moment 
of celebration or humiliation of a raced body is the moment of racial 
pleasure and the moment of the consumption of racial pleasure.   
Computer games are bought and sold.  They are conceived 
and created as commodities.  The racial pleasures associated with 
the playing of a computer game include the consumption of 
commodified racial tropes.  In contrast, a police stop for driving 
while Black is not commodified in any traditional sense.  While the 
officer is an employee and is paid, the interactions of police officer 
and individual citizen or person are not commodified relations.  A 
police officer is not paid for individual actions.  Detentions, arrests, 
and criminal investigations are not separately priced.  Thus, the basic 
relationship of police officer and resident are not separately 
commodified, although, as argued above, they can include distinct 
moments of racial pleasure.  
Racial performance in the workplace is a more complex 
context.  All of those involved are usually employees, and the racial 
performance is set within the employment relationship and part of 
the commodified nature of labor relationships.  The racial pleasure 
components, however, are not traditionally regarded as workplace or 
job-related and are only indirectly related to the buying and selling of 
employees’ labor. 
The commodification of racial pleasure in computer games 
and the entertainment industry, as well as our earlier examples, 
suggest that many racial practices involve these commodified racial 
forms.   
 
D. A Proposal for Illicit Racial Pleasure 
 
With Justice Thomas’ comments in mind, this Essay next 
examines a proposal that addresses racial subordination in 
commodified racial pleasures.  The starting point is the premise that 
there are racial representations and racial depictions so laden with 
“intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression”68 that 
they deserve to lose some legal protections.  Next, we observe that 
under our current racial practices, the invention, circulation, and 
reinforcement of intimidating and terrorist racial representations can 
occur through racial pleasures in their commodified forms.  When 
the racial pleasure crosses over into “intimidating and terrorist” 
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expression, then that racist representation is deemed an “illicit racial 
pleasure.”  The proposal is that illicit racial pleasures should be “de-
commodified.”  That is, a depiction of “illicit racial pleasure” should 
lose all intellectual property rights and protections. 
Following the Supreme Court’s approach in obscenity cases, 
the definition of ‘illicit racial pleasure” follows the landmark decision 
in Miller v. California.69  First, regulation of illicit racial pleasure is 
limited to offensive racial representations specifically defined by 
state or federal law.  Second, such regulation of illicit racial pleasure 
is limited to specific racial representations:  those which the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find 
appeal to the prurient interest in racial pleasure; those which portray 
race in a patently offensive way; and those which do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  Third, an illicit 
racial pleasure shall lose all intellectual property rights and 
protections.   
This proposal is not a criminal prohibition but a civil 
regulation.70  Its application can be prospective to avoid any 
property takings issues.  And its ambiguity, as in the case of 
obscenity, acts as a brake upon the production of illicit racial 
pleasures.  The proposal is intended to focus discussion on the 
possibilities for government intervention into illicit racial pleasures.71   
In addition to this proposal for regulation of commodified 
racial pleasure, there is the additional possibility of theorizing 
commodified racial practices within more general commodification 
theories.  My own research into commodified race, especially the 
idea that these commodified forms were consumed to generate 
racial pleasures, led me to the theories of commodity circulation in 
Marx’ writings on political economy.  
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III. COMMODIFIED RACE IN MARX’ CYCLE OF COMMODITY 
CIRCULATION 
 
This section seeks to situate commodified race within Karl 
Marx’ cycle of capitalist production.  In an often-studied passage, 
Marx describes commodity circulation under capitalism as a cycle 
with four discernible stages:  Production, Distribution, Exchange, 
and Consumption.  After a brief examination of Marx’ language, this 
Essay examines how to place commodified race within this 
production cycle. 
In his Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx 
wrote: 
PRODUCTION creates articles corresponding to 
requirements; DISTRIBUTION allocates them 
according to social laws; EXCHANGE in its turn 
distributes the goods, which have already been 
allocated, in conformity to individual needs; finally 
in CONSUMPTION the product leaves this social 
movement, it becomes the direct object and servant 
of an individual need, which its use satisfies.  
PRODUCTION thus appears as the point of 
departure, consumption as the goal, distribution and 
exchange as the middle, which has a dual form, 
since according to the definition, DISTRIBUTION 
is actuated by society, and EXCHANGE is actuated 
by individuals. In production persons acquire an 
objective aspect, and in consumption objects 
acquire a subjective aspect; in distribution it is 
society which by means of dominant general rules 
mediates between production and consumption; in 
exchange this mediation occurs as a result of 
random decisions of individuals.72 
This four part cycle outlines a general system of 
production.  We can describe its application to an ordinary 
consumer commodity—a chair.  Chairs are commodities 
created in Production.  Once chairs are produced, then 
Distribution is the social decision as to how chairs shall be 
allocated within society.  Some parts of society will get more 
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chairs while some will get less.  Exchange is the random 
process of distribution—the buying and selling of chairs in 
the market.  The final moment is the use of the chair in 
Consumption.   
 
Here is a visual version of Marx’ theory: 
 
CYCLE OF COMMODITY CIRCULATION 
 
 
In this passage, Marx summarizes significant parts of his 
political economy.  The very limited purpose of this section is to 
suggest that after identifying elements of commodification in 
racial practices, those commodified racial practices can be 
interpreted within the four stages of production, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption.   
In the example of race in computer games, the making of 
commodified racial images occurs in the production stage.  And, 
as Marx indicates, “production creates articles corresponding to 
requirements.”73  In other words, computer games and the racial 
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representations in the games are produced with a consumer 
market in mind.  If racial images are popular, then racial 
representations will be included.  If there is a market for the 
consumption of commodified racial representations, then 
computer games will be generated for that market.  It is at the 
stage of production in the making of the computer games with 
racialized images that the creative process operates.  Distribution 
is the social decision as to how computer games are allocated.  In 
general, computer games are located within broad commercial 
markets and pricing determines allocation of consumer 
commodities.  Exchange is the actual distribution, buying and 
selling  of consumer computer games.  Racial pleasure is enjoyed 
at the final stage of Consumption.  When a computer gamer plays 
the game and enjoys defeating or otherwise consuming a racial 
representation, that person is enjoying a racial pleasure and 
participating in a vicarious racial subordination.   
As an extension of this examination of commodified 
racial pleasure, it is possible to examine other forms of the 
commodification of race.74  Labor power—both in its 
commodified form as wages and working conditions, and as the 
bodies available for labor—can be viewed through this 
framework.  For much of our history, the most important form 
of racialized labor was chattel slavery.  Since the end of the Civil 
War, racial differentiations in salary and working conditions, with 
African American workers receiving less than white workers, is a 
common phenomenon and a clear form of racial subordination.  
We can group together these racial subordinations in labor and 
employment as racialized labor power and recognize racialized 
labor power as commodified racial labor power.  As a 
commodity, racialized labor power traditionally has been subject 
to legal regulation.  Racial subordination in the form of 
differential conditions for African American labor was the widely 
accepted until the modern civil rights era. 
We can trace the regulation of commodified racial 
pleasure and commodified racial labor power by identifying the 
legal topics under which the regulation of these forms of 
commodified race takes place.  Commodified racial pleasure is 
directly regulated by contract, intellectual property law, and the 
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First Amendment.  Commodified racial labor power is directly 
regulated through labor law, Title VII, contract law, and property 
law.  We can insert these categories of legal regulation into Marx’ 
production cycle to see how the legal regulation of commodified 
forms of race have been divided functionally—by where they are 
in the production cycle—and by legal topic, again depending on 
where they are in the production cycle.  
The following chart suggests how different areas of the 
law that address commodified race might be interpreted and 
situated within Marx’ Cycle: 
 
LAWS REGULATING COMMODIFIED RACIAL 
PLEASURE AND COMMODIFIED RACIAL LABOR 
POWER WITHIN MARX’ COMMODITY CYCLE 
  
Grouped together under Distribution are the areas of law 
that address the workplace.  The continuing disparity between white 
and African American salaries, for example, is part of the social 
allocation of salaries for workers.  The broad allocation of salaries 
and benefits between capital and labor is regulated in labor law, Title 
VII, and property.  Under Exchange, we see an area of the law that 
regulates the actual distribution, buying, and selling of commodities:  
Contract law addresses market exchange.  Finally, under 
















consumption of commodified racial pleasure—the First 
Amendment and intellectual property law.   
This re-interpretation of race is possible once we have 
recognized that modern racial practices include significant moments 
of commodified forms as well as non-commodified forms of racial 
subordination.  The growth and visibility of commodified forms of 
racial subordination open racial practices to further analysis under 




The demise of explicit racial segregation, the acceptance of 
colorblind norms in law and American culture, and the Obama 
election have led to the popularization of the term “postracial” to 
describe our present racial climate.75  This Essay contests the 
assertion that we have moved beyond race.  Instead, our racial 
practices are shifting and require new descriptions.  
The first section describes how—despite the Supreme 
Court’s claims that racial discrimination has disappeared—additional 
forms of racial subordination are now seen as distinct from racial 
discrimination.  The authors summarized in this section describe 
and identify complex forms of racial subordination as always present 
but now becoming more visible. 
Racial pleasure is an important concept that needs further 
exploration.  Other examinations of identities in legal studies—
notably feminist studies and queer theory—have included pleasure 
as a dimension within subordination.  Legal studies should not 
overlook this obvious aspect of race in America.  The proposal for 
de-commodification of illicit racial pleasures is an effort to 
encourage imagination in addressing racial practices. 
The insertion of commodified forms of racial subordination 
into Marxist theory is an effort to provide additional depth and 
breadth to our studies of race.  Marx’ theory of commodity 
circulation offers an alternative to traditional perspectives on 
multiple areas of racial subordination.  Marxist commodity theory 
opens the possibility of a comparative study of commodification of 
racial pleasure, commodification in employment discrimination, and 
commodification of racial subordination in other areas of private 
law. 
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These comments outline important alternative perspectives 
on racial practices in the United States.   
 
